Introduction
Countries endowed with fish stocks possess absolute advantages in fisheries. Countries with a greater ability to exploit fish stocks possess comparative advantages in fisheries. The utilisation of the comparative advantages in fisheries gives rise to economic gains through specialisation, assuming the presence of fisheries management to avoid overexploitation. Ownership of fish resources are national, implying that utilisation of comparative advantages across countries require continuous adaptation. Quota exchange between countries is a commonly applied instrument to adaptation.
The purpose of this paper is, by means of a case study of the European Union (EU), to identify the importance of country-wise quota exchange and to assess the extent to which gains from specialisation can be achieved through liberalising access to fishing quotas. Owing to stock externalities in fisheries, management is necessary to obtain long-run economic gains. Biological management has to ensure sustainability, whereas economic management is necessary to promote the economic efficiency of fishing. With the introduction of the 200 nautical mile Extended Economic Zone, nations had the opportunity to claim the ownership of fish stocks within their zone in the late seventies and early eighties [1, Article 56] . However in the EU, member states' fish stocks are a common resource, and therefore it is the Council of Ministers of the EU which decides on the total allowable catches (TAC) and the quota allocation for each member state. It is within the competence of each state to decide how to allocate and manage this quota. Hence, biological management is decided by the Council, based on a Commission proposal, while economic management is a member state issue.
General limits for fishing capacity and effort are adopted by the Council, while the choice of the concrete management system is decided by each member state. Several different management systems are applied in different fisheries within the member states, ranging from regulated open access, via regulated-restricted access, to property right-based management like individual transferable quota schemes. However, with a recognised overcapacity of the EU fleet [2, 3] , changing the management approach can help to improve the economic gains in several EU fisheries.
Economic gains can be achieved by each member state through the introduction of property right-based management [4, 5, 6, 7] . Several right-based management systems exist in EU fisheries in various forms, from pure individual transferable quota and license systems to systems where fishing rights are indirectly transferable and capitalised in the vessels themselves.
Achieving the full economic gains within the EU, however, further requires more liberal access to fishing quotas in order to utilise comparative advantages in fisheries. In general, a country with a higher productivity than another, for a given industry, possesses a comparative advantage. The difference in productivity might be caused by several factors, including differences in skills, capital and labour costs, including access to capital investment and availability of state aids and subsidies. In fisheries, however, management is a further important determinant of productivity. Within the EU, economic management of fisheries differs considerably between the member states [8] . Therefore, productivity differences exist and member states with a good track record of economic management might possess comparative advantages in fisheries. If these comparative advantages are to result in specialisation gains, the liberalisation of access to fishing quotas would be necessary. The consequence of liberalising access to fishing quotas is that the relative stability principle fixing the quota allocation between member states might be affected. Hence, a trade-off between achieving specialisation gains and keeping a fixed quota allocation exists.
The hypothesis is that quota exchange rarely occurs and affects relative stability only to a limited extent, thereby leaving unachieved economic gains from specialisation in EU fisheries. The main reason is overcapacity in EU fisheries, implying that most economically viable quotas remain fully used by the owner country and there are only few unused quotas to exchange away. Furthermore, member state governments are not expected to make cost-benefit analyses of how much value added one group of vessels has to give up in order for another to obtain a larger value added. National quota allocations between groups of vessels are not expected to change considerably by making country-level quota exchanges. Provided that the hypothesis holds there are unused economic gains from specialisation from the existence of an EU fisheries sector, beyond those resulting from more efficient national management. If it does not hold, these specialisation gains do not exist. The paper is organised as follows. In section two, the quota allocation mechanism is described. In section three and four, respectively, the scale of quota adaptation and the influence on relative stability are assessed. In the last section potential specialisation gains are identified and the ways on how the gains can be achieved are discussed.
Quota allocation
The allocation of fishing rights between member states of the European Community was agreed following long negotiations on 25 January 1983 as a part of the Common Fisheries Policy [9] . This allocation is specified in the relative stability key still used today. The relative stability key had the political purpose to avoid lengthy discussion every year about allocation of the agreed Total Allowable Catches (TAC) and an industry purpose to give a reasonable security about catches and thus future planning [10] . The actual determination of the relative stability key was based on three elements. The first was historic catches based on a reference period from 1973-1978. The second was special provisions for fisheries dependent areas also known as the Hague preferences. Finally, jurisdictional losses following the implementation of the 200 nautical mile Extended Economic Zone by third countries were compensated. Complex calculations taking these three elements into consideration were afterwards performed in order to derive the "final" relative stability key.
Since The quota allocated to each member state via the relative stability key can initially be seen as rather restrictive for the utilisation of the comparative advantages. However, a member state has the possibility of changing this by making quota exchanges with another member state. It is noted, however, that quota exchange should not impact relative stability per se, as they are of temporary nature. Nevertheless, these exchanges are an indication of additional economic interests of member states' fishing industries that are not fully met by initial quota allocations to member states. The possibility of country-level quota exchange between member states was introduced with the CFP as early as 1983 [9] . Quotas can be exchanged on a temporary basis, but continuously repeated exchange is also possible. Therefore, quota exchange can be considered both as a short run flexible instrument, but also as a long run structural instrument.
Based on stock recommendations primarily from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, the European Community negotiates TACs for each species and management area regulated by using overall catch limitations. Following these agreements, the EU's part of the TAC is distributed to its member states by using the relative stability key. Besides EU member states, several other countries obtain a share of the TAC such as Norway, the Faroe Islands and Russia. For example, each year Norway and the European Community reach an agreement regarding the seven shared fish stocks in the North Sea, and undertake a series of exchanges of fishing possibilities in the North Sea and Northeast Atlantic.
The agreed TAC for 2004-2006 for the whole Northeast Atlantic area for all quota species is shown in Table 1 together with the share of the EU and member states 4 . 1. The salmon TAC is measured in pieces, and has thus been converted to weight assuming the average weight of a salmon to be five kilograms. 2. The TAC more than double in 2006 mainly due to a substantial increase in blue whiting, which is a TAC only utilised to a limited extent.
An example of how the EU's part of the eight cod TACs is allocated among member states is shown in Table 2 . 
Quota adaptations
Adaptations in quota occur between member states, which are not directly linked to individual fishermen. Instead quota adaptations are taken from or given to the overall member state quota level, which is then allocated to the individual fishermen accordance with the national regulation 5 . Three means of adaptation in the quota allocated to a member state can be identified: 1) Transfers between years 2) Revised recommendations during a year 3) Exchanges within a year The EU legislation facilitates a flexible quota management system as specified in Council Regulation no. 847/96. If a member state has over-or underutilised some of its allocated quotas, this is generally deducted from or added to the quotas in the following year. However, the frequency of these transfers has not been possible to determine from the available data.
New information may for different reasons become available during a year, leading to a reassessment of the biological advice. This may be based on new biological survey data or revised catch statistics. Uncertain stock conditions may also imply that quotas are set during the year. This has, for instance, been the case for the sand eel fishery since 2006, where the quota is determined in May based on the year-class abundance in the previous year.
An individual member state can on its own initiative make adaptations within a year in its allocated quotas. Three types of adaptations can be identified:
1) An exchange between member states 2) An interchange within a member state 3) A transfer within a member state Member states can exchange quotas between each other based on mutual agreements. These exchanges can cover different species and areas depending on the exact agreement. Since 2000 an interchange has only been utilised in 2001 and 2002, where Denmark converted 19,000 tonnes of sand eel in the Norwegian zone of the North Sea to Norway pout in the same area. Finally, a member state can be allowed to transfer quota from one area to another for the same species. A classic example of quota exchanges between member states is the Arcachon agreement. Since 1992, a bilateral agreement between France and Spain modifies the allocation of quotas between both countries every year, increasing the French anchovy quota in exchange of increasing the Spanish hake quota 6 . The amount of quota involved in each of the three adaptation types is shown in Table 3 . A steady increase in the exchanged amounts is observed during the seven years. Compared to the first years, a doubling is observed for 2005 and 2006. Although several reasons can have caused this, the most important and likely reason is that the quotas have become more restrictive in the national fisheries, and this has increased awareness about adaptation possibilities and the desire to utilise these in the member states. The majority of quota adaptations are made by means of exchanges between member states, and hence this is the focus of the present analysis. There can be several reasons for such exchanges. Generally, the involved countries must be expected to obtain a benefit from making an exchange. The quotas are more or less determined individually. Therefore, it is often the case that member states run into a situation where some quotas are constraining, while others are not. If some of the constrained species are caught together with unconstrained species, this results in the fishery being closed. In order to continue the fishery, the member state can therefore try to find countries with excess amounts of the constrained species, and negotiate an exchange. Member states may also exchange for more altruistic purposes by giving unused quota away without obtaining anything in return.
The following tables give an overview of involvement of EU countries in exchanges 7 . Table 4 shows the provided quota amounts for each country, while Table 5 describes received amounts. The amounts traded are of course highly influenced by the type of species involved. Measured in weight, the TACs for low value species (typically fish used for reduction) are generally much higher than the TACs for species used for human consumption. Therefore it is not surprising that fish for reduction are among the most exchanged species based on weight, cf. Table 6 . If we convert the conducted exchanges into value using average yearly prices 8 , the picture changes significantly, cf. Table 7 . As expected the species used for human consumption increase their relative importance. In total, the catch value of all exchanges from 2000 to 2006 is estimated to be € 1.8 billion, if they are fully utilised. This gives a yearly average of € 251 million with an increasing tendency over the years. In Table 8 net quota exchanges measured in value are shown for each member state. It is observed that only two countries, Germany and France, lose catch value from quota exchanges. The remaining fourteen countries have all observed an increase in their catch value. 
Influence of adaptations on the relative stability key
The turnover of the whole EU fishing fleet from all fishing areas was € 6.4 billion in 2004 [13] . The annual average of exchanges made for quotas in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean was € 251 million over 2000-2006, which thus comprised some 4% of the total turnover, according to Table 9 . Taking into account that a part of the total turnover originates from outside the Northeast Atlantic Ocean, exchanges formed more than the 4% 9 . Germany and Belgium are heavily engaged in quota exchanges, both as providers and recipients. The importance of quota exchanges for Denmark and the Netherlands are also above the EU average. Several other member states are engaged in exchanges around the average rate of 4%.
The difference between providing and receiving measures the net-effect of exchanges on relative stability. The potential German turnover falls by 12% compared to what could have been achieved provided that Germany had used the quotas themselves. The Lithuanian, Polish and Dutch turnover are positively affected, increasing by 6%, 4% and 3% respectively. Turnover of all other member states are affected by 2% or less. Hence, except for Germany quota exchanges have a limited effect on relative stability. [13] The importance of quota exchanges differs among species, however, as shown in Table 10 . Measured as a percentage of total EU catches in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean, redfish, anchovy, horse mackerel and blue whiting are exchanged to the largest extent. Reasons include that the quotas of these species might not be fully utilised. Furthermore, it appears that herring and demersal species like cod, hake, anglerfish, haddock and plaice are also exchanged to some extent. Hence, larger vessels dependent on industrial species, such as herring and mackerel, are particularly reliant on the exchanges, although vessels generally dependent on demersal fish also have an interest in exchanges. This can be compared to the annual transfer of quotas in the national individual transferable quota systems in Iceland, which on average traded 38% of the total quota in 2006-2007. For the three main species of cod, shrimps and redfish, quota trade was 26%, 30% and 35% respectively [14] .
Quotas can only be exchanged on a temporary basis for one year. However, repeated quota exchanges can be made, implying that the exchanges obtain a more permanent character. To identify exchanges of almost permanent character, the share of exchanges made repeatedly in the same species in the same area, and between the same provider and recipient countries, are identified. The share of repeated exchange is identified in Table 11 . Exchanges made in the beginning of the year where quotas are not yet constraining reveal more permanent character than if done later in the years where quotas become constraining. It appears that 877,000 tonnes of the total exchanges of 1,931,000 tonnes were exchanges in the first quarter of the year. Of these exchanges, 20% were repeated in all the seven years and 17% repeated in six of the years. These exchanges have permanent character. Of the exchanges made over the whole year, 20% were made in all seven years and a further 6% in six of the seven years. These exchanges have almost permanent character. Hence, around one-fourth of the exchanges have permanent or almost permanent character.
Discussion and conclusions
With national fisheries management systems differing considerably between EU member states in allowing continuous minimisation of costs through transferability [12] , some member states possess comparative advantages in fisheries. Given the level of quota exchanges of 4% of total turnover, these comparative advantages are used to obtain gains from specialisation, since member states are presumed to participate in exchanges only if they obtain a gain from doing so. Compared to the Icelandic situation, this 4% is low. Hence, positive but low specialisation gains are revealed. There are several reasons for the low specialisation gains. One is that member states need to exchange quotas away. In a situation with overcapacity where member states use several of their quotas fully, they might not have anything to exchange away. A second reason is that exchanges are of relative low importance for the single fishermen if country-level quota exchanges are allocated equally among fishermen. A third reason might be the lack of knowledge of the exchange opportunity among fishermen.
Given the low level, further specialisation gains can still be achieved with exchanges between governments on a temporary basis, where it is necessary to provide unused quotas in order to receive extra quotas. However, as we have seen, it is not possible for the single fishermen to optimise activities by purchasing quotas permanently from foreign fishermen. Furthermore, in a situation where there is overcapacity, member states might not have quotas to exchange away implying that the present quota exchange instrument might not work efficiently. Therefore, unachieved specialisation gains exist in EU fisheries.
The maximum specialisation gains can be achieved with full liberalisation of access to fishing quotas within all EU member states. This could also allow exchanges directly between individual fishermen from different member states in the form of transfers of quotas in exchange for money. Thereby, instead of claiming that one quota shall be exchanged for another, and that quota adaptations need to form part of the general management system, fishermen can organise their fishing activity and utilise their individual comparative advantages across borders. Allowing individual transfers would also do away with complicated and time-consuming quota exchanges between member state authorities. Furthermore, achieving the maximum specialisation gain also require that permanent transfers are allowed. Thereby, it will be possible for the individual fishermen to plan long-term investments after a quota purchase, instead of planning only one year ahead.
Specialisation gains can also be achieved at a more limited scale, either by allowing only some of the above mechanism or by allowing them only for certain fleet segments, areas or member states. Elements of such a policy already appear in the EU. In Denmark, individual quota exchanges in herring were allowed in 2006, giving the individual fishermen the opportunity of exchanging quotas with other member states. In 2007, individual quota exchange of mackerel and industrial species across borders were also allowed. Furthermore, elements of such a policy is applied in the recently renewed agreement on EU fishing in Greenland waters, which allow unused quotas of different member states to be transferred to other EU fishermen [15] . Elements of a policy promoting specialisation gains gradually could also be constructed by allowing individual crossnational permanent quota transfers within a specified fleet segment or area. For example, one could start by allowing such transfers among large vessels operating over long distances, since they gain from simultaneous access to waters in several member states. Another option is to allow individual cross-national permanent quota transfers within a specified area. For example, the northern hake fishery in the Northeast Atlantic or fisheries governed by regional fisheries organisations could provide an opportunity for fishermen in a well defined area to set up a tradable quota system. Implementing these options could increase gains from specialisation, but might in effect also touch on the basic principle of relative stability.
Allowing individual cross-national permanent quota transfers might further imply that member states indirectly obtain an incentive to improve policies aiming at improving economic efficiency. For example, by allowing transferability, fishermen from member states with such policies implemented might be able to purchase quotas from fishermen from member states without such management. The reason is that fishermen from member states with good management practices possess comparative advantage in fisheries and can therefore probably outcompete fishermen with less well-functioning management systems.
Setting up a market within the EU, where individual fishermen can exchange quotas, will need to consider several key aspects in order to obtain a well-functioning market that is capable of extracting the highest economic gains. In addition to the initial allocation of quotas to the individual vessels, transaction costs, non-profit maximising behaviour and market failures like concentration, illegal behaviour and imperfect information, it is also necessary to look at the administrative design of the market. The administrative design includes considerations regarding market structure, participants, information and instruments.
The structure of the market can either be in form of centralised market, where all exchanges have to be made through one single exchange authority, or a decentralised market, where individuals themselves find who to exchange with. Defining who can buy and sell quotas is important to consider. Besides the fishermen, it has in some situations been discussed whether other people should be allowed to participate in the market. However, allowing organisations and citizens to participate can potentially impede the achieving of an economically efficient situation [16] , although brokers may help to 'lubricate' the market [17] . It is also important that potential buyers and sellers have perfect information on price and availability of quotas. As within financial markets, several different types of instruments can be allowed in order to increase flexibility and reduce risk. Examples of such instruments could be futures, insurance pools and leasing and banking possibilities [18] .
Thus besides initiating a quota exchange market, there are a range of other issues that need further consideration in order to obtain the highest economic efficiency.
